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Discrimination in Employment-Remedies-STANDARDS GOVERN-
ING BACKPAY AWARDS FOR VIOLATIONS OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody1 the Supreme Court has con-
sidered, for the first time, the standards which should govern
awards of backpay to minority employees adversely affected by
discriminatory employment practices in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 In reaching its decision, the Court
had to define the basic philosophy of Title VII and make some
accommodation between this philosophy and the competing inter-
ests of employers and minority employees. This question has vexed
the courts of appeals; they have been unable to agree as to when
backpay awards may be denied because, until now, there has been
no generally accepted rationale for granting the awards.3 The
conflict in the circuits has focused on whether an employer's good
faith efforts to comply with Title VII should be a defense to
1 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973). Backpay as a remedy for
discrimination may also be imposed as a condition of contracting with the federal govern-
ment under proposed guidelines from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. 41 C.F.R.
§§ 60-1.1 to -1.9 (1975).
3 Compare Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972),
modified, 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974) (class members denied backpay where employer acted
in good faith), and Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 6 CCH E.P.D. t 8679, at 5037 (S.D.
Ohio 1972), rev'd, 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973) (error to deny backpay absent exceptional
circumstances), with Bush v. Lone Star Steel Corp., 373 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (class
awarded backpay although employer's racial motivation not shown), and United States v.
Bricklayers Local 1, 5 CCH E.P.D. 8480, at 7305 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), affd sub nom. United
States v. Masonry Contractor's Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974) (backpay an appropriate
remedy in "pattern or practice" suit). These cases indicate the conflicting results obtained
before the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits adopted similar backpay standards. A direct
conflict can be found by comparing the district court's action in Albemarle (for the substance
of this decision, see the opinion of the court of appeals, Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474
F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973) ) with the opinion in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th
Cir. 1971), affg 319 F. Supp. 835 (M.D.N.C. 1970), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971). On almost identical facts, one court denied backpay and the other granted the relief.
See notes 27-49 and accompanying text infra. Inconsistent results on whether or not to award
backpay are still being obtained in some circuits. Compare United States v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973) (backpay
denied where employer's bad faith not shown), with United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973) (backpay granted in absence of a showing of specific intent to
discriminate).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
backpay claims. Some courts have allowed the defense,4 some have
considered it as a factor in guiding the court's discretion, 5 and
others have found it totally irrelevant. 6
The Supreme Court's opinion is a blend of doctrines enun-
ciated by the courts of appeals, as well as an attempt to resolve their
conflicts. Because Albemarle is the culmination of a line of decisions
in the circuits, it is essential to understand this background. This
Note will therefore examine the statute and its legislative history to
outline the purposes of the backpay remedy, study the various
solutions of the courts of appeals (with special emphasis on the
good faith defense), and analyze the Albemarle opinions to see to
what extent the Supreme Court has circumscribed the power of the
district courts to deny backpay.7
4 See notes 27-49 and accompanying text infra.
5 See notes 43-44 and accompanying text infra.
' See notes 50-74 and accompanying text infra. Actions which have been asserted as
good faith efforts to comply with Title VII include the voluntary abolition of segregated
departments, affirmative action hiring programs, validation of tests used for hiring and
promotion, efforts to conform to judicial interpretations of the Act, and efforts to modify
discriminatory provisions of collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Moody v. Albemarle
Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Johnson v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
7 This Note does not deal with the issue, also involved in Albemarle, of employment
testing and the quantum of proof necessary under the Act to show that these tests are job
related. See 422 U.S. at 425-35. The Act allows such testing as long as it is not used to
discriminate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The issue of employment testing is primarily
relevant to the preliminary determination of Title VII liability, although the issue here is the
range of remedies available after a violation has been found. The Supreme Court had
already dealt with the broad testing issue, and it placed the burden on the employer to prove
the job relatedness of the tests he uses. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
An important issue in Albemarle was the deference to be given to the guidelines
established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on test validation.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1975); see note 60 infra. In recent years, the courts of appeals have
required increasingly strict application of these guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia
Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973). In Albemarle, the Court did not give these
guidelines the force of law. It did decide, however, that, as a source of professionally
accepted standards and an administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,
the guidelines are to be given deference. 422 U.S. at 431. The import of this part of the
decision may, however, be questioned since a contrary holding would have considerably
weakened the validation requirements. For example, the Wonderlic aptitude test was used by
Albemarle for hiring and promotion purposes. This test has been held by every court of
appeals considering it to have an adverse impact on blacks and not to be job related. See
Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Young v. Edgcomb Steel Co., 499 F.2d 97 (4th
Cir. 1974). The Albemarle decision also seems to leave room for an employer to avoid the
guidelines by producing convincing evidence of professional disagreement with them. See
422 U.S. at 435. See generally Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test
Validation: A Uniform Standard for Both Public and Private Employers, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
505 (1973); 10 HoUsroN L. REv. 989 (1973).
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I
BACKPAY AND THE SCHEME OF TITLE VII
In discussing the applicability of Title VII remedies, courts
have stressed the need to look to the broad purposes of the Civil
Rights Act. In the Albemarle decision, the Supreme Court stated:
[G]iven a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should be
denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not
frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimina-
tion throughout the economy and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination.8
It is therefore essential to understand the basic foundation of the
Act.
Title VII outlaws present and future job discrimination, in-
cluding facially neutral employment practices when they are
superimposed on a history of discrimination and perpetuate its
effects. 9 Discriminatees may bring suit in federal court if they have
exhausted the administrative remedies in the Act. 10 If the court
finds an unlawful employment practice, it is authorized to "enjoin
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment prac-
tice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay.""
The backpay remedy was patterned on that of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).' 2 Originally, the drafters of the Civil
Rights Act intended that the criteria for awarding such relief would
8 422 U.S. at 421.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
10 The EEOC is the administrative agency created by the Act with which charges must
first be filed. The agency then investigates the charges and seeks voluntary compliance
through conciliation. Once the charge has been filed with the EEOC and that agency has
given notice to the aggrieved individual that it has not been able to achieve voluntary
compliance within 30 days, a suit may be filed in the district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)
(Supp. III, 1973). See Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973). The courts have uniformly held the
backpay provision to be discretionary. See, e.g., Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d
1251 (5th Cir. 1975); Paper Mill Workers Local 186 v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F.
Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1969). Attorney's fees may also be awarded. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1970).
12 See 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); id. at 7214
(interpretative memorandum of Senators Clark and Case); H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 9(0) (1963). The National Labor Relations Act authorizes "affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay" when the Board has found an unfair
labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
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be drawn from judicial and administrative interpretations of the
NLRA provision. 3 Under that statute, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) has consistently awarded backpay, 14 and the
Supreme Court has endorsed these actions as part of the affirma-
tive action needed to remedy past abuses.' 5 Thus, the original
intent was that backpay be liberally awarded. The NLRA analogy,
however, is imperfect because of amendments made by the Senate
to ensure that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) would not become as large as the NLRB. 6 As a result,
Congress did not give the EEOC the right to institute a civil action,
and the amendments to the Civil Rights Act emphasize that
backpay awards are discretionary.1 7
Despite these changes, the NLRA analogy remains a valid
indication of congressional intent. Originally, the Civil Rights Act
was based on the public policy of eliminating discrimination
throughout the economy, and individual rights were subordinated
to this policy. The amendments focused on the individual vindica-
tion of private rights through court action. Commentators have
observed that, given this new focus, backpay should never be
denied,' 8 and one case has followed a similar approach to Title VII
'3 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). Senator Humphrey
and Senator Kuchel were the general leaders of the Senate debate on Title VII. One of the
reasons for the passage of a federal statute and inclusion of a backpay provision was the
inadequate enforcement record of state fair employment practices commissions. The states
rarely used the backpay remedy. See Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice
Commissions: A Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. REv. 22 (1964). See
generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 431 (1966).
14 See, e.g., NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1963), enforcing 137
N.L.R.B. 25 (1962); In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935); 2 NLRB
ANN. REP. 148 (1937). But see In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 19 N.L.R.B. 778, 802 (1940).
"' See, e.g., Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
16 Amendment No. 656 to H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. VII, 110 CONG. REC.
11,930-34 (1964). The objections were primarily those of Senator Dirksen, who worked
informally with the House and Senate conferees. See 110 CONG. REc. 6445-51 (1964)
(remarks of Senator Dirksen).
17 The original version provided that the court "shall" order affirmative relief, but this
wording was changed to "may" order relief. Amendment No. 656 to H.R. 7152, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess., tit. VII, § 706(g), 110 CONG. Ec. 11,930-34 (1964) (Mansfield-Dirksen substitute
bill). The only other change affecting the backpay provision was a reduction of the award by
the amount of interim earnings. These were the amendments adopted by the Senate after
much debate. Id at 14,511 (1964). The House concurred in them without change. Id. at
15,897 (1964). That individualized relief was not originally of primary importance is
indicated by the provision added in the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill under which the
EEOC would only act in the public interest to obtain general compliance with Title VII,
rather than to seek individual redress. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707(b) (1963).
" See, e.g., Moroze, Backpay Awards: A Remedy Under Executive Order 11246, 22 BuFF. L.
REv. 439 (1973); Morse, The Scope of Judicial Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
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enforcement. 19 But a more consistent analysis of congressional
intent must recognize that the rights protected by the Act have
both a public and a private character. The Senate amendments
added to, but did not supplant, the original purposes of the
legislation.2 0 Thus, because of the public interest in protecting
individual discriminatees, 2 1 backpay should be awarded whenever
it will help make the victim whole.
This "make whole" purpose of Title VII remedies was
reaffirmed by the 1972 amendments to the Act.2 2 At that time,
Congress limited the accrual period for backpay to two years
before the filing of charges with the EEOC. 23 The purpose of this
limitation was not, apparently, to withhold complete relief. Rather,
it seems to have been intended to encourage the courts to grant
backpay in more cases.2 4 Further evidence of this intent to
strengthen the enforcement provisions is the authority given the
EEOC to institute a suit on behalf of the "aggrieved party" when
conciliation fails.2 5 Beyond the make whole purpose for including
the backpay remedy, the legislative history can provide few addi-
tional guidelines because it is often inconsistent and incomplete.2 6
1964, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 516, 522 (1967). It is doubtful, however, that the drafters realized
the implications of this change.
19 See Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 61 L.R.R.M. 2458 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
20 Senator Humphrey noted that "[tihe basic coverage and the substantive prohibitions
of the title remain almost unchanged." 110 CONG. REc. 12,721 (1964). The powers finally
given the EEOC show this combination of public and private interests protected by the Act.
Thus, the Commission may file its own charges or, subject to the approval of the court in
cases of "general public importance," intervene in a private action. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(f)
(Supp. III, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-5 (1970).
2 Cf. UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S, 205, 220 (1965).
22 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. III, 1973),
amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
23 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973). Originally, the only time limit was the July
2, 1965, effective date of the Act. The final backpay limitation was much less restrictive than
the one offered in the House, which would have limited the accrual period to two years
before the case was filed in court. H.R. 6760, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(e) (1971). The
limitation on backpay was the only change made in the remedies subsection.
24 The spokesmen of the House and Senate conferees, Congressman Carl Perkins and
Senator Harrison Williams, believed that Congress gave discretion to the courts in order to
foster a policy of liberal remedies and encourage "the most complete relief possible." 118
CONG. REc. 7168 (1972) (Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746 by House and Senate
Conferees). Restoration of the discriminatee to his rightful place was specifically mentioned
as an objective of the amendments. See notes 67-72 infra. See generally Sape and Hart, Title
VII Reconsidered. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 824
(1972).
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (Supp. III, 1973).
26 Much of the history is found in the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments adopted by the
Senate, but these were formulated in informal sessions between the House and Senate
leaders, and there were, therefore, no conference committee reports. See Vaas, Title VII:
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It was therefore left to the courts to determine the circumstances in
which backpay could be denied without contravening the broad
purposes of the Civil Rights Act.
II
LOWER COURT RESPONSES TO BACKPAY CLAIMS
The issue of when backpay relief may be denied has arisen
most often in cases where facially neutral practices have per-
petuated the effects of past discrimination. In such cases, the
employers have generally attempted in good faith to comply with
Title VII, yet their minority employees have continued to suffer
economically. 27 Both sides therefore have strong arguments con-
cerning the propriety of a backpay award. In choosing between
these two interests, the courts of appeals have developed two
different rules. The special circumstances rule is based on the
remedial principle of complete relief to the discriminatee; the
equitable rule, on the other hand, balances both sides, but places
special emphasis on fairness to the employer.
Those courts which generally uphold denials of backpay con-
sider, as did the district court in Albemarle, the employer's inno-
cence either as a mitigating factor or as a bar to recovery. The good
faith defense has been accepted most often in sex discrimination
cases where the employer complied with a state female protective
statute.28 These state laws existed before the passage of the Civil
Rights Act, and employers developed employment practices in
compliance with them. These same employment practices were
later found violative of the federal statute.
Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 431, 457 (1966). The length of the debate, the
great public interest, and the multiplicity of viewpoints add to the inconsistencies in the
legislative history.
27 See, e.g., Duhon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 494 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1974);
Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974); Sprogis v. United States Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Richards v. Griffith
Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
2 These statutes regulated working conditions, hours, and wages of female workers,
and prohibited the employment of females in certain occupations. See, e.g., N.Y. LABOR LAW
§§ 172, 203-b (McKinney 1965), as amended, N.Y. LABOR LAW § 172 (McKinney Supp. 1975);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4107.42-.43, 4107.46 (Page 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 101,
103(c) (1972). Congress seems to have intended to preempt only state laws requiring an act
unlawful under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1970). The state female protective laws have
generally been held to be preempted under this provision. See, e.g., Ridinger v. General
Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th
Cir. 1972). See also Ash v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 483 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1973); CCH EEOC
DECISIONS 6104, at 4153 (1973).
1976]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
A few courts have held that there is no violation of Title VII
when a female protective law is involved. In one such case, Garneau
v. Raytheon Co.,2 9 the employer had applied for a waiver of the state
law and later terminated compliance with the statute immediately
after it was ruled invalid.30 The court in Garneau reasoned that an
innocent employer could not intentionally commit an unlawful
employment practice.3 ' This rationale, however, is inconsistent
with the prevailing view of Title VII liability,3 2 and has not been
widely accepted.
The Third Circuit followed a more persuasive rationale in
Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.33 In that case, Westinghouse had
refused to promote a female employee to the position of computer
console operator because a Pennsylvania law prohibited her from
working the hours required for the job. 4 Specifically rejecting the
special circumstances rule,35 the Third Circuit chose a more flexi-
ble approach to backpay. Although it admitted there was an inten-
tional violation of Title VII, the court believed that the employer's
good faith reliance on the state law overshadowed the plaintiff's
need for recovery.36
Thus, an employer's good faith is irrelevant to the initial
finding of a Title VII violation, 'but may limit the defendant's
available remedies.3 7 The reason for this conclusion is the employ-
er's dilemma of choosing between compliance with the federal law
or the presumptively valid state law.38 If an employer has reason to
know the state law has been preempted, he, of course, cannot rely
on the Kober defense. The courts, however, have not agreed on
29 341 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1972). See also Baxter v. Birkins, 311 F. Supp. 222 (D.
Colo. 1970).
30 341 F. Supp. at 338.
31 Id.
32 It is now generally accepted that the word "intentional" in the statute requires only
that the employment practice itself be intentional and not an accidental occurrence. As long
as the practice was a deliberate one and caused discrimination in fact, there is a violation of
Title VII whether or not the employer intended the discriminatory effects. See note 65 infra.
33 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
3' Id. at 243. The Pennsylvania law limited females to a five hour work period with
thirty minute rests between periods. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 101, 103(a), 107 (1964), as
amended, (Supp. 1975).
35 480 F.2d at 247. In support of this action, the court cited the dissenting opinion of
Judge Boreman of the Fourth Circuit in Albemarle. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d
134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
36 480 F.2d at 248.
37 Accord, Manning v. General Motors Corp., 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 946 (1973).
38 480 F.2d at 249. See also Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir.
1974).
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what constitutes sufficient notice to invalidate the defense. The
Kober court suggested that only a judicial determination would
suffice.39 Other courts have also required a judicial determination
or a declaration by a state attorney general, but not necessarily a
final decision. 40 The Act itself suggests an administrative ruling by
the EEOC would suffice.41 And at least one court has suggested the
passage of Title VII itself was sufficient notice of illegality.4 2
A court following the equitable rule need not adopt a per se
rule to apply the Kober defense, in which good faith by itself may be
sufficient to require denial. Instead, the courts may consider good
faith reliance as one factor to be considered.43 The results of some
of these decisions, however, are inconsistent with the reason for
allowing the defense. The defense should only be allowed to a
defendant who was required by a state statute to perform a
discriminatory act. In one case, a union was allowed to assert the
defense." This extension of the good faith reliance rule seems
unwarranted since it was the employer who was regulated by it and
who would be liable for damages under the Act.
Sex discrimination is not the only area in which backpay has
been withheld on good faith grounds. A few district courts have
refused to grant backpay awards in any case absent a showing of
racial motivation,45 and others have put the burden on the claimant
39 480 F.2d at 249.
'0 See, e.g., Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir.
1972); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
4 Title VII provides, in pertinent part:
[N]o person shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of (1)
the commission by such person of an unlawful employment practice if he pleads
and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith, in conform-
ity with, and in reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of the Commission
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970). But such an opinion must be a definite legal judgment
signed by the General Counsel. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
42 Although in this case there was no conflicting state law, the Fifth Circuit has stated
that "the unsettled nature of the law applicable to a particular employment practice does not
constitute a legally cognizable defense to a claim for back pay in a Title VII suit." Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; 491 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974).
43 See Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 407 (7th Cir. 1974); Schaeffer v.
San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972). But see Sprogis v. United
States Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
44 Wernet v. Meat Cutters Local 17, 484 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1973).
'5 Banks v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 360 F. Supp. 1372 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Davis v.
Ameripol, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 284 (E.D. Tex. 1972). The Eighth Circuit has denied backpay
where an employer had not acted in bad faith, although the court did order the defendant
to give minority workers their rightful place of employment. United States v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 310-11 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973).
But see United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973).
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to prove his own good faith.46 These courts have often required
the claimant to meet four standards. First, he must satisfy the
job-related 47 requirements for the higher position. Second, a job
vacancy must have existed which he could have filled but for the
discrimination. Third, the job opportunity must have arisen within
the backpay limitation period. Fourth, the claimant must show that
he would have accepted the new position. To some extent, these
decisions confuse the standards for granting classwide backpay
with the methods for determining individual grants.48 They er-
roneously conclude that, because backpay is individual redress, it is
necessarily distinguishable from classwide remedial relief.49 The
two are separate but related determinations. Once discrimination
has been proved, the court may award backpay to the class as a
whole, but further proceedings are necessary to determine which
individuals are entitled to relief and in what amounts.
III
STANDARDS ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT
Like the Fourth,50 Fifth, 51 and Sixth"2 Circuits, the Albemarle
Court adopted a rule which directs the district courts to exercise
46 Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); Larson v. United States,
296 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1961).
47 The Supreme Court clarified the standards for proving job-relatedness in Albemarle.
422 U.S. at 425-35. See note 7 supra.
48 See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 11 BNA F.E.P. CASES 553 (5th Cir.
1975). Originally, the courts would grant an injunction for the entire class, but would grant
backpay only to named plaintiffs. The reason was that only the named plaintiffs had filed
charges with the EEOC; other class members had not exhausted the administrative reme-
dies. See McCoy v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 5 CCH E.P.D. 8405 (D.D.C. 1973); Broussard v.
Schlumberger Well Services, 315 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Texas 1970). Courts have applied the
same principle to named intervening plaintiffs. Austin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F. Supp.
1145 (E.D. Va. 1970). This result was thought to be mandated by Rule 23(b)(2), which
mentions only injunctive or declaratory relief for a class as a whole. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
See Baham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 55 F.R.D. 478 (W.D. La. 1972). However, more
recent cases have allowed classwide relief if the named plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of
Rule 23(b)(2). It is now common to have a separate proceeding to determine entitlement on
an individual basis after the issue of liability has been tried. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257-63 (5th Cir. 1974). At this second proceeding such issues as job
vacancies, pay rates, qualifications, and mitigation may be considered. Rule 23(b)(2) is now
interpreted to allow the courts to grant other relief. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495
F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1975). See notes 101-02 and accompany-
ing text infra.
49 422 U.S. at 414 n.8.
" Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 405
(1975); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
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their discretion and award backpay unless special circumstances are
shown which would render it substantially unjust. The Court did
not accept good faith as a special circumstance because it was found
irrelevant to the goals of eliminating discrimination in various
sectors of the economy. 53
A. The Special Circumstances Rule
Albemarle was brought by former and present black employees
against their employer and union. 54 The plaintiffs alleged that job
seniority and non-job-related tests discriminated against them. Al-
though the employer, Albemarle Paper Company, had ended its
overt racial discrimination before the effective date of Title VII,
the seniority system continued the effects of its prior discrimination
until after 1968. 55 The district court found that this system violated
Title VII, enjoined its future use, and ordered the imposition of
plantwide seniority. 56 But the court, applying the equitable rule,
refused backpay for at least two reasons. First, it found that
Albemarle had acted in good faith because it had voluntarily
merged its formerly segregated lines of progression, took steps to
conform to judicial interpretations of the Act, and generally paid
higher wages than its competitors.57 Second, the plaintiffs had
originally stated they did not seek backpay-their claims were
asserted five years after charges were filed, although still before
trial. 58 Several other factors may have influenced the court, includ-
ing the difficulty of determining individual grants and the absence
of unjust enrichment to Albemarle. 59
5 Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
5 Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973).
5 Good faith is specifically mentioned in Title VII only in one subsection providing that
good faith reliance on an EEOC written opinion is an affirmative defense to liability. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970).
5" 422 U.S. at 408.
"5 This seniority system was mandated by the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
409.
" The district court found Albemarle's tests to be job-related, so that the backpay issue
arises only in connection with the seniority system. However, both the Fourth Circuit and the
Supreme Court overturned this ruling on job relatedness and stated that equitable relief
would be available for testing violations as well. Id. at 436.
57 Id. at 410.
58 Id.
59 It is unclear whether the district court considered these factors independently or
cumulatively as reasons for denying backpay. See Petitioner's Brief at 59-60, Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The unjust enrichment argument has been
successfully used to avoid backpay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 (1970). Shultz v. Mistletoe Express Serv., Inc., 434 F.2d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir. 1970).
Cf. Landaas v. Canister Co., 188 F.2d 768, 770-71 (3d Cir. 1951).
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On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the denial of backpay as
an abuse of discretion. 60 The Fourth Circuit, relying upon Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises,61 held that backpay should have been
awarded, 62 and followed a line of Fifth Circuit cases that formu-
lated the special circumstances rule. One such case was Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 63 which, like Albemarle, involved a
discriminatory departmental seniority system and claims of good
faith compliance by the employer. 64 Prior to 1968, Goodyear em-
ployed blacks primarily in low-paying jobs in separate departments.
In that year, the employer instituted an affirmative action program
allowing blacks to transfer freely to new departments, but the
collective bargaining agreement's seniority system gave them no
credit for prior service in their former department. 65
60 The courts failure to enjoin Albemarle's testing program was also appealed. The
district court had accepted the conclusions of Albemarle's industrial psychologist, based on
his comparisons between test scores and supervisory judgments of competence, that the tests
were job-related. 474 F.2d at 137-38. However, this validation study did not 'comply with
EEOC guidelines requiring separate validation for minority and nonminority groups, nor
did it consider the possibility of alternative selection procedures. See 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1607.5(b)(5), 1607.7 (1975). For these reasons, the Supreme Court did not accept the
finding of job relatedness. 422 U.S. at 436. Under these guidelines, an employer must show
a relationship between the aptitudes tested and the requirements of the job. If the test
attempts to forecast future advancement, the testing is only allowed if the advanced
employment would be attained reasonably quickly. Although the Supreme Court has shown
no desire to strike down the guidelines, the Albemarle opinion might allow an employer to use
a professionally acceptable alternative method, such as job sample tests. The Court thought
the guidelines provided certain minimum standards for determining job-relatedness, but did
not indicate that an employer must comply with every technicality of the guidelines. See 422
U.S. at 435.
61 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See note 66 infra.
62 474 F.2d at 142.
63 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). The action was brought both under Title VII and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
64 The actions claimed to have constituted good faith included termination of segre-
gated departments, abandonment of testing and education requirements, and attempts to
modify the collective bargaining agreement which imposed departmental seniority. 491 F.2d
at 1369.
6- Id. at 1369-70. The program originally required the employee to have a seventh
grade education and pass a written examination, but in 1971 these requirements were
dropped.
Departmental seniority systems have uniformly been held violative of Title VII. See, e.g.,
Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). The employer's motivation is considered
irrelevant to the finding of liability under Title VII. An intentional employment practice is
discriminatory for the purposes of Title VII if it affects blacks disproportionately to whites,
even though it was not adopted for that purpose. All that need be shown is that the
employment practice itself was intentional and not the result of accident or oversight. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
The union in Johnson was also held liable for backpay as a party to the collective
bargaining agreement which produced the discriminatory system. 491 F.2d at 1381-82. See
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The Johnson court held that, as a matter of law, Goodyear's
good faith was irrelevant to the backpay claim and all dis-
criminatees were "presumptively entitled to an appropriate award
of back pay."' 66 The court reasoned that the purpose of the remedy
was to put the discriminatee in his rightful economic place, a
question on which the employer's state of mind had no bearing.67
Thus, in calling for a class approach to backpay relief, the court
resolved any doubts on entitlement in favor of the employee. The
burden of proof was first on the claimant to show that he was a
member of the aggrieved class. Then the employer had to meet a
high burden of proof in showing that the employee would never
have transferred from his department. 68 Thus, the only relevant
special circumstance was that an individual was never kept from his
rightful place of employment.
The same court elaborated upon the "rightful place" doctrine
in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. 69 One of the issues in that
case was whether the district court could deny backpay based on
the employer's assertions that the award was not necessary to
ensure his future compliance. In rejecting this additional element
of the defense, the court stated that the question of future com-
pliance is relevant to injunctive relief, but that backpay is con-
cerned only with the continuing effects of past injuries.70 This is
also Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Texas 1973). Lone Star rejected the
argument that practices based on the seniority and promotion provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement could not be intentionally discriminatory.
66 491 F.2d at 1374-75. The Supreme Court has applied a similar rule to the awarding
of attorney's fees in Title II cases. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400
(1968). The statute makes attorney's fees discretionary. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970). The
same standards seem to apply to attorney's fees under Title VII. Id. § 2000e-5(k). See
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1972). The analogy between attorney's fees and
backpay awards is not convincing. The purpose of the award of attorney's fees is to help
provide representation for victims of discrimination, but backpay serves a compensatory
purpose. The analogy was rejected by the Court in Albemarle. 422 U.S. at 415.
67 491 F.2d at 1375. The Fourth Circuit, in rejecting a similar good faith argument,
reasoned that
back pay is not a penalty imposed as a sanction for moral turpitude; it is compensa-
tion for the tangible economic loss resulting'from an unla%4ful mpioyment practice.
Under Title VII the plaintiff class is entitled to compensation fbr that loss, however
benevolent the motives for its imposition.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
68 491 F.2d at 1375.
69 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974). Here, as in Albemarle, the employer used certain tests
for hiring, promotion, and transfer purposes, without an intent to discriminate. Despite the
company's efforts to validate the tests, and the approval of the tests by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance, statistics showed an adverse impact on blacks, and therefore, the court
held the testing program illegal under the standards of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971). 494 F.2d at 216-19.
70 494 F.2d at 253. Accord, Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir.
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the basic approach of the Supreme Court in Albemarle; the purpose
of the remedy is to give an employee the advancement he would
have had but for the discrimination. 7' Backpay, therefore, should
be awarded even though it inflicts punishment on the employer.7 2
The "rightful place" doctrine thus seems to require backpay relief
for all "but for" effects of prior discrimination.
In addition to good faith, a defense sometimes asserted is one
predicated on the doctrines of waiver or laches. This arises when
the claimant has delayed his request for backpay until late in the
litigation, thereby prejudicing the defendant insofar as he will not
be able to present all his possible backpay defenses. The three
circuits considering this defense have held that, because of its
importance, the backpay claim must still be considered.7 3 This is
the area, however, in which the Supreme Court differed with the
"special circumstances" courts. The range of special circumstances
accepted by those courts is so narrow it may be nonexistent in
practice. Those decisions left the trial courts no discretion to deny
1973). This is a revival of a similar rightful place argument often used in NLRB cases that
eventually led to the rule that when economic hardship results from undeservedly low
earnings, backpay must be awarded even if some hardship results for the employer. See, e.g.,
Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952). Cf. NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258
(1969). A variation of the rightful place doctrine, less favorable to discriminatees, was
applied by the Fifth Circuit in Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). In that case, the doctrine was used to deny
minority workers the right to "bump" incumbent white workers as a remedy for discrimina-
tion. See 80 HAtv. L. REv. 1260 n.2 (1967).
71 This "but for" relationship between racial discrimination and an individual's failure
to advance can present significant problems of proof for individual claimants. By creating a
presumption of entitlement to backpay and placing the burden on the employer to defeat it,
the Fifth Circuit's approach avoids much of this difficulty. See notes 102-03 and accompany-
ing text infra.
72 494 F.2d at 253. The rightful place doctrine has recently been used in a different
context to deny Title VII relief to minority workers, hired under affirmative action
programs, who are laid off pursuant to a "last hired, first fired" seniority system. See Watkins
v. Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); Jersey Central Power and Light Co.
v. IBEW Local 377, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1974). The Waters case was brought under § 1981, but Title VII standards
were used in the analysis. In each case, the doctrine was used to determine that there was no
Title VII violation. In that context, the "rightful place" concept refers only to employment
position, rather than economic position as it was used in Pettway.
"' Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870
(1973); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). In each of these
cases, the claim was merely presented after the end of the trial. The Supreme Court,
however, reversed the denial of backpay in an NLRB case where there was a five-year delay.
NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Corp., 396 U.S. 258 (1969). The delay defense is closely linked to
good faith defenses. Where the claimant originally disclaimed any intention to seek backpay,
the defendant might argue it is bad faith on the claimant's part to assert the claim late in the
litigation. See notes 91-95 and accompanying text infra.
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backpay on a classwide basis, although a court may withhold
individual grants in some cases.7 4 The Supreme Court fell short of
saying there were no circumstances in which backpay relief could
be denied to all members of a class.
B. Restrictive View of Trial Court Discretion
In the majority opinion,75 Justice Stewart borrowed heavily
from the special circumstances rule on the good faith question and
measured the denial of backpay against the purposes of Title VII.
The major purpose, according to the opinion, was to make whole
the victim of discrimination, and the good faith defense was re-
jected as inconsistent with this purpose. But outside the ambit of
good faith, the opinion left much to the discretion of the trial
court.7 6 Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but dis-
agreed with the majority's suggestion that good faith could never
be a defense. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, did not agree with the majority's restrictive view
of trial court discretion.7 8
Recognizing the importance of consistency in the law,7 9 Justice
Stewart's first task was to decide where to look for guidance on the
denial of backpay. Rejecting the analogy to Piggie Park, 80 he looked
almost exclusively to the legislative history of Tide VII and found
that "the primary objective [of the backpay provision] was a
prophylactic one."' 81 It was meant both to compensate the victim
and to deter the employer. Consequently, the majority decided that
any denial of backpay must now be measured against these two
purposes; a district court denying backpay must show that this
denial would not frustrate either of these objectives.82 Justice
Stewart further attempted to define the roles of the district courts
and the courts of appeals in backpay cases:
74 See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974).
73 422 U.S. at 408-36.
76 Id. at 436.
77 Id. at 447-49.
78 Id. at 449-53.
79 Id. at 416-17. Although acknowledging that some flexibility must remain, Justice
Stewart emphasized that "[i]mportant national goals would be frustrated by a regime of
discretion that 'produce[d] different results for breaches of duty in situations that cannot be
differentiated in policy.' Id. at 417, quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375
(1969).
80 See note 66 supra. The Court treats this as a case of first impression on the backpay
issue. Prior Supreme Court cases are referred to only as an aid in interpreting the broad
aims of Title VII. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
81 422 U.S. at 417. The opinion specifically endorses the NLRA analogy and the
rightful place doctrine.
82 Id. at 421.
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The courts of appeals must maintain a consistent and principled
application of the backpay provision, consonant with the twin
statutory objectives, while at the same time recognizing that the
trial court will often have the keener appreciation of those facts
and circumstances peculiar to particular cases.83
The Court's standard greatly restricts all defenses based on the
employer's state of mind. Justice Stewart was compelled by his view
of the purposes of Title VII to reject the Kober standard and find
good faith an insufficient reason to deny backpay s4 Furthermore,
the opinion suggests that good faith is never a factor to be consid-
ered because it would defeat the purpose of the statute. 5 Such a
conclusion is reasonable in light of the Act's dual purposes since
the good faith argument assumes that the primary purpose of
backpay is punitive rather than compensatory.8 6 The logical effect
of the Court's "statutory purposes" standard would seem to be to
disallow the good faith defense even in female protective law cases.
The majority declined to decide this issue,8 7 but Justice Blackmun
noted that this conclusion follows from the Court's reasoning. 8
Injunctive and backpay relief are to be considered as com-
plementary remedies under Title VII, according to Justice
Stewart.8 9 This linking of backpay with injunctive relief is a strict
limitation on trial court discretion, but it is designed to ensure "the
most complete relief possible." 90 The effect will be to require
backpay awards on a classwide basis, even though the claim is not
brought by an individual. Class actions should therefore be an
effective remedy for individuals (through backpay) as well as for
the class and society as a whole (through injunctive relief). Public
policy, which may require that emphasis be placed upon the
elimination of discrimination in certain sectors of the economy,
need not sacrifice the interests of individuals. Their interests will be
protected through classwide backpay relief.
C. Remaining Discretionary Authority
Although the Court's opinion severely limits the discretion of
the district courts in denying backpay, it does not go so far as the
special circumstances rule, nor does it necessarily provide a more
workable standard. Many cases must still be left to the trial court's
83 Id. at 421-22.
84 Id. at 422.
85 Id. at 423.
86 Id. at 422.
'1 Id. at 423 n.18.
88 Id. at 448.
" Id. at 423.
90 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972) (Section-by-Section Analysis of Title VII).
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discretion due to "circumstances peculiar to particular cases." 91
Justice Stewart recognized this when he dealt with Albemarle's
second defense to backpay, the delay argument. The district court
apparently accepted Albemarle's assertion that it would have de-
fended more vigorously had it known of the backpay claims ear-
lier.92 Justice Stewart agreed that relief may be denied when delay
in asserting a backpay claim causes substantial prejudice in fact.93
On such "issues of procedural regularity and prejudice, the 'broad
aims of Title VII' provide no ready solution. ' 94 Thus, whenever
the statutory purposes do not obviously favor the claimant, as in
the prejudicial delay question, there is no presumption of entitle-
ment and the trial court may use "its traditional discretion" 95 to
deny backpay.
Unfortunately, the result here is not mandated by the remedial
and deterrence principles, making it inconsistent with the Court's
treatment of the good faith defense. Delay in asserting a claim is
not more relevant to the need for relief than is an employer's good
faith. Furthermore, if injunctive and backpay relief are such closely
linked remedies, the defenses asserted at trial for injunctive relief
should also apply to backpay. For these reasons, Justice Marshall
noted in his concurring opinion that the bar of substantial preju-
dice should be an especially difficult one to establish, and should
only be used to limit the accrual period for backpay. 96
Other situations in which the district courts may deny backpay
under this standard include cases in which employment is sought
for the purpose of testing the employer's practices. 97 In such a
case, the statutory purposes favor denial because there is no need
to make the person whole, and a backpay award would be punitive.
Similarly, the relief may be denied when an employer shows that
the claimant acted in bad faith. A potential backpay windfall may
induce an employee to seek relief even though he would never
have transferred to the higher paying job. The denial in such a
case might be based on a clean hands theory,98 as well as the
statutory purposes analysis.
91 422 U.S. at 422.
92 474 F.2d at 135.
91 422 U.S. at 424.
94 Id. at 425, quoting Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 141 (4th Cir. 1973).
15 422 U.S. at 424.
6 Id. at 441 & n.* (concurring opinion). Additional defenses could be presented when
individual entitlement is determined.
97 See Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, Inc., 498 F.2d 1397 (4th Cir. 1974); Lea v.
Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969), aff'd in part, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971).
98 Justice Stewart's opinion recognized that "the court's discretion is equitable in
nature .... 442 U.S. at 416. See als0Thornton v. Past Texas Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416
(6th Cir. 1974).
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The practical difficulties of determining an award present
another problem which may justify denial to individuals, although
the difficulty of ascertainment cannot be used to preclude backpay
relief to every employee in a class. 99 The courts have been unable to
supervise backpay relief in cases where the class was ill-defined,
individual awards were small, or the amounts due were not easily
ascertainable. 00 In these cases, the expense of determining the
awards might be prohibitive. Especially where classwide backpay is
awarded to unnamed class members, 10 the make whole objective is
often irrelevant because of the impossibility of determining an
individual's rightful place.
The district courts will retain much discretion over the method
of awarding backpay to individuals. After the first stage of a Title
VII suit, the finding of discrimination creates a presumption in
favor of entitlement for each member of the affected class. In the
second stage of the suit, each individual must show that he is a
member of the class and that he was affected by the discrimina-
tion. 10 2 In simple cases, the person may be able to do this by
reconstructing his work history; the court would then award
backpay to those individuals it believes would have filled job vacan-
cies that actually existed during the period of discrimination. This
reconstruction of a claimant's work history, however, cannot be
precise, especially in complex fact situations. In those cases, the
court might use as a guideline a similar employee group which was
not injured by the discrimination. Another solution would be to
award pro-rata shares of backpay, with adjustments for the number
of years the individual would have been available for promotion. In
applying such a formula, the court might obtain help from a
special master or from the EEOC. In any case, the defendant
would have a very heavy burden if he wished to prove an indi-
vidual was not entitled to relief.10 3
99 422 U.S. at 442 (concurring opinion, Rehnquist, J.). See United States v. United States
Steel Corp., 11 BNA F.E.P. CASES 553 (5th Cir. 1975).
100 This argument might be used in cases in which the plaintiffs claim they were not
allowed to advance to a craft requiring a greater degree of skill. Years later, it may be
impossible to decide which discriminatees who are now unqualified for the higher position
would have been qualified but for the racial discrimination. See Norman v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 497 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). Thus, to determine
which claimants need to be made whole, the courts would be forced to make a speculative
projection of each individual's potential. In such situations, the special circumstances rule
has the advantage of consistency since it resolves such doubts in the employee's favor.
101 See 422 U.S. at 414 n.8.
102 See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975).
103 Id. The defendant might be able to show that an individual was not entitled to relief
by showing that there was a significantly higher rate of refusal of promotions by blacks than
by others.
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In these cases, the statutory purposes analysis used in Albemarle
provides no ready solution. To some extent, then, the standards
governing backpay awards continue to be vague. Some Title VII
plaintiffs must therefore still rely on injunctive relief alone, which
will be insufficient to restore them to their rightful places, thus
allowing some of the effects of prior discrimination to go un-
checked.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Albemarle will necessarily
have a great impact on the overall effectiveness of Tide VII, since
backpay is not only a factor in motivating individuals to seek relief,
but also a deterrent to future discrimination. As Title VII cases
proliferate, these two purposes will become more important. The
decision significantly restricts the power of the district courts to
deny backpay relief in Title VII cases. Claims must now be mea-
sured against the Tide VII objectives identified by the Court.
Therefore, absent procedural difficulties, classwide backpay relief
may only be denied if there is a specific showing that an award
would neither make the claimant whole nor discourage future dis-
crimination. On the one hand, the defense that the employer acted
in good faith is no longer sufficient to deny backpay. On the other
hand, delay in asserting a claim may be sufficient grounds for
denial. As to the methods by which awards are to be determined,
the decision provides only limited assistance, and the district courts
will retain more discretion over this aspect of the backpay remedy.
Michael S. Piraino
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